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Abstract—We propose adversarial embedding, a new steganog-
raphy and watermarking technique that embeds secret informa-
tion within images. The key idea of our method is to use deep
neural networks for image classification and adversarial attacks
to embed secret information within images. Thus, we use the
attacks to embed an encoding of the message within images and
the related deep neural network outputs to extract it. The key
properties of adversarial attacks (invisible perturbations, non-
transferability, resilience to tampering) offer guarantees regard-
ing the confidentiality and the integrity of the hidden messages.
We empirically evaluate adversarial embedding using more than
100 models and 1,000 messages. Our results confirm that our
embedding passes unnoticed by both humans and steganalysis
methods, while at the same time impedes illicit retrieval of the
message (less than 13% recovery rate when the interceptor has
some knowledge about our model), and is resilient to soft and (to
some extent) aggressive image tampering (up to 100% recovery
rate under jpeg compression). We further develop our method
by proposing a new type of adversarial attack which improves
the embedding density (amount of hidden information) of our
method to up to 10 bits per pixel.
Index Terms—deep neural network, adversarial attack, image
embedding, steganography, watermarking, privacy
I. INTRODUCTION
Machine Learning (ML) is used to tackle various types
of complex problems. For instance, ML can predict events
based on the patterns and features they learnt from previous
examples (the training set) and to classify given inputs in
specific categories (classes) learnt during training.
Although ML and, in particular, Deep Neural Networks
(DNNs) have provided impressive results, they are vulnerable
to the so-called adversarial examples. Adversarial examples
are inputs that fool ML, i.e., cause misclassifications. The
interesting thing with adversarial examples is that the mis-
classifications are triggered by a systematic procedure. This
procedure is tailored to alter the input data (images in partic-
ular) in such a way that is not noticeable by human eyes.
The elusive property of adversarial data has always been
perceived by the research community as a major weakness
that should be avoided or mitigated. While this is important
for specific application domains, we argue that such a property
can be useful, e.g., to support watermaking and steganography
applications. Therefore, our paper takes a different perspective
on adversarial attacks by showing that the main properties
of targeted attacks (invisibility, non-transferability, resilience
and adaptation against input tampering) can be used to form
strong watermaking and steganography techniques, which we
call Adversarial Embedding.
Digital watermarking and steganography are methods aim-
ing at hiding secret information in images (or other digital
media), by slightly altering original images (named the cover
images) to embed the information within them. Watermark-
ing techniques require the embedding to be robust (i.e. re-
silient to malicious tampering) while steganography focuses
on maximizing the amount of embedded data (that is, achieve
high-density embedding). Of course, undetectability and un-
recoverability by a non-authorized third party are of foremost
importance in both cases. Thus, the image embedding the
secret information (named the stego image) should not be
detected by steganalysis techniques.
Our objective is to pave the way for a new generation
of watermarking and steganography techniques relying on
adversarial ML. We believe that
Existing steganography and watermarking techniques either
are easily detected, manage to embed limited amount of
information, or are easily recoverable [1]. This means that
there are multiple dimensions on which the techniques need
to succeed. Notably, previous research achieves relatively good
results in a single dimension but not all. In contrast, our
technique dominates on multiple dimensions together. For in-
stance, we can embed much more information without risking
them to be recovered by a third party. We can also outperform
the performance of existing techniques by considering single
dimensions alone. All in all, our paper offers a novel and
effective watermarking and steganography technique.
Applying our technique requires a DNN classification model
with multiple output categories and a targeted adversarial
attack. In the case of steganography, we assume that the model
has been ’safely’ shared between the people that exchange
messages. In the case of watermarking, the person who embeds
and extracts the messages is the same and thus there is no need
for such an assumption.
The classification model is used to extract the hidden mes-
sages by mapping the output classes to bits. The adversarial
attack (non-transferable targeted attack on the shared model)
is used to embed information by creating adversarial images
(the stego images) from original images (the cover images)
in a way that the model is forced to classify the adversarial
images in the desired classes (corresponding to the message to
encode). Since the attack is non-transferable, only the shared
ar
X
iv
:1
91
2.
01
48
7v
1 
 [c
s.C
R]
  1
4 N
ov
 20
19
model can identify the embedding and give the sought outputs.
The contributions made by this paper can be summarised in
the following points:
We propose a pipeline that uses adversarial attacks to
embed information in images. It can be used both for image
watermarking and steganography and is founded on the fast-
pacing research on adversarial attacks. We call this approach
Adversarial Embedding. Our pipeline relies on a targeted
adversarial attack called Sorted Targeted Adversarial Attack
(SATA) that we specifically develop for this work. Our ad-
versarial attack increases the amount of possible data that can
be hidden by using multi-class embedding. SATA is capable
of embedding seven times more data than existing adversarial
attacks with small models (with 10 output classes like the
Cifar-10 dataset), and orders of magnitude more with bigger
models (with 100 output classes for example).
The steganography literature contains few approaches that
use Deep Learning to embed data. Baluja proposed a system
with 2 deep neural networks, an encoder and a decoder [2].
Zhu et al. expanded that idea to a system with 3 convolutional
neural network to play the Encoder/Decoder/Adversary [3].
Volkhonskiy et al. on the other hand proposed to use a custom
Generative Adversarial Network [4] to embed information.
The main advantage of our pipeline over the previous
techniques relying on deep learning is that it does not require
a specific model to be designed and trained for this task. It
can indeed be used with any image classification model and
adversarial attack to enforce higher security.
We demonstrate that our pipeline has competitive steganog-
raphy properties. The fact that SATA (the new attack we
propose) builds upon a state-of-the-art adversarial attack algo-
rithm allows us to generate minimal perturbation on the cover
images. This places our approach among the steganography
techniques with the least footprint.
We also show that Adversarial Embedding with SATA can
achieve almost 2 times the density of the densest steganogra-
phy technique [1], with an embedding density up to 10 bits
per pixel.
We analyze the resilience of our system to tampering and
show that, because our system allows the freedom to choose
any image classification model in the pipeline, we can find
a combination of classification models and adversarial attacks
resilient to image tampering with more than 90% recovery rate
under perturbation.
Finally, we assess the secrecy of our system and demonstrate
that available steganalysis tools poorly perform in detecting or
recovering data hidden with adversarial embedding.
II. BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK
A. Steganography
Steganography is the process of hiding important informa-
tion in a trivial medium. It can be used to transmit a message
between a sender A and a receiver B in a way that a malicious
third party M cannot detect that the medium contains a hidden
message and, in the case M still detects the message, M should
not be able to extract it from the medium (Fig 1).
The term Steganographia was introduced at the end of the
15th century by Trithemius, who hid relevant messages in his
books. Since then, steganography expanded and has been used
in various media, such as images [5] and audio [6].
Steganography techniques use either the spatial domain or
the frequency domain to hide information.
When operating on the spatial domain, the steganography
algorithm changes adaptively some pixels on the image to
embed data. Basic techniques to embed messages in the spatial
domain include LSB (Least Significant Bit) [7] and PVD
(Pixel-value Differencing) [8]. Among last generation spatial
steganography techniques, the most popular are:
• HUGO [9] - Highly Undetectable steGO:
HUGO was designed to hide 7 times longer message than
LSB matching with the same level of detectability.
• WOW [10] - Wavelet Obtained Weights:
WOW uses syndrome-trellis codes to minimize the ex-
pected distortion for a given payload.
• HILL [11] -High-pass, Low-pass, and Low-pass:
HILL proposed a new cost-function that can be used to
improve existing steganography. It uses a high-pass filter
to identify the area of the image that would be best to
target (less predictable parts).
• S-UNIWARD [12] - Spatial UNIversal WAvelet Rela-
tive Distortion:
UNIWARD is another cost function, it uses the sum
of relative changes between the stego-images and cover
images. It has the same detectability properties as WOW
but is faster to compute and optimize and can also be
used in the frequency domain.
Frequency domain steganography, on the other hand, relies
on frequency distortions [13] to generate the perturbation.
For instance during the JPEG conversion of the picture. Such
distortions include Discrete Cosine Transform (DCT), Discrete
Wavelet Transform (DWT) and Singular Value Decomposi-
tion(SVD). In a nutshell, the frequency domain attacks change
some coefficients of the distortions in a way that can only be
detected and decoded by the recipient.
Many techniques have been built around this approach, the
most known are J-UNIWARD [12] and F5 [14].
The technique we propose, adversarial embedding uses
images as media. Its novelty lies in the use of adversarial
attack algorithms that can embed the sought messages in the
form of classification results (of adversarial examples) of a
given ML model. The information is not embedded in the
pixels themselves but in the latent representation of the image
formed by the classification (ML) model that processes the
image. Some of these latent representations can be tailored
using adversarial attacks and be extracted in the shape of
classification classes.
B. Watermarking
Digital Watermarking aims at hiding messages inside a
medium. Unlike Steganography, however, the recipient is not
supposed to extract the message. That is, when someone, say
A, watermarks a medium and shares it with a receiver, say B,
it is expected that neither B nor any third party M can detect
the watermark and decode it (only A should be able to do
that). Watermarking has multiple applications like copyright
protection or tracking and authenticating the sources of the
mediums.
Thus, while digital watermarking and steganography use the
same embedding techniques, they favour different qualities of
the embedding. For instance, steganography aims to maximize
the quantity of data that can be embedded within the medium.
Watermarking focuses more on the integrity of the embedded
message, in particular when the medium is subject to pertur-
bations during its life cycle.
C. Steganalysis
Steganalysis is the field opposite to steganography. It is ded-
icated to the detection of messages hidden using steganography
techniques. Traditionally, steganalysis had to manual extract
the features relevant to the detection of every Steganography
technique.
Steganalysis techniques use various approaches to detect
hidden messages [15]. Hereafter some of the most notable
approaches when facing spatial-domain steganography:
• Visual Steganalysis: It analyzes the pixel values and their
distribution. It is sufficient to detect basic inconsistencies,
for instance, unbalanced distribution of zeroes and ones
that indicates LSB steganography. Given the original
cover images, visual steganalysis techniques can identify
the difference between the two and assess whether this
noise is an artefact or if it is meaningful.
• Signature Steganalysis: Many steganography solutions
append remarkable patterns at the end of the embedded
message. For instance, Hiderman steganography soft-
ware adds CDN at the end while Masker, another tool
dedicates, the last 77 bytes of the stego-image for its
signature. A steganalysis tool would scan the files for
such signatures.
• Statistical steganalysis: Detectors of this family focus
on some statistics that are commonly modified as a result
of the embedding process. SPA (Sample Pair Analysis)
method [16], RS (Regular and Singular groups) method
[17] and DIH (Difference Image Histogram) method
[18] are among the most popular statistical steganalysis
techniques.
• Deep Learning steganalysis: Deep learning models are
becoming more popular as steganalysis approach. They
can be trained to learn the features of existing steganogra-
phy approaches and detecting them with high rates [13].
They require however the interception of a large amount
of cover and stego-images and the ability to label these
images [19].
D. Adversarial examples
Adversarial examples result from applying intentional small
perturbation to original inputs to alter the prediction of an ML
model. In classification tasks, the effect of the perturbation
goes from reducing the confidence of the model to making
it misclassify the adversarial examples. Seminal papers on
adversarial examples [20]–[22] consider adversarial examples
as a security threat for ML models and provide algorithms
(commonly named “adversarial attacks”) to produce such
examples.
Since these findings, researchers have played a cat-and-
mouse game. On the one hand, they design defence mecha-
nisms to make the ML model robust against adversarial attacks
(avoiding misclassifications), such as distillation [23], adver-
sarial training [24], generative adversarial networks [25] etc.
On the other hand, they elaborate stronger attack algorithms
to circumvent these defences (e.g., PGD [26], CW [27]).
One can categorise the adversarial attack algorithms in three
general categories, black-box, grey-box and white-box. Black-
box algorithms assume no prior knowledge about the model,
its training set and defence mechanisms. Grey-box ones hold
partial knowledge about the model and the training set but have
no information regarding the defence mechanisms. Finally,
white-box algorithms have full knowledge about the model,
its training set and defence mechanisms.
The literature related to applications of adversarial examples
is scarcer and mainly rely on the ability of those examples to
fool ML-based systems.focuses on their ability to fool ML-
based systems used for, e.g., image recognition [28], malware
detection [29] or porn filtering [30]. In this work, we rather
consider adversarial examples as a mean of embedding and
hiding secret messages.
Our embedding approach relies on 3 attributes of adversarial
examples:
• Universal existence of adversarial examples: Given
sufficient amount of noise , we can always craft an
adversarial image for a model M1, starting from any
cover image I to be classified into target class v1.
• Non-transferability of targeted adversarial examples:
A targeted adversarial image crafted for a model M1 to be
classified as v1 will have a low probability to be classified
as v1 if we use any model M2, M2! =M1 to decode it.
• Resilience to tampering of adversarial examples: A
targeted adversarial image crafted for a model M1 to
be classified as v1 will still be classified as v1 by M1
if the image has suffered low to average tampering and
perturbation.
These attributes have been studied by previous research on
adversarial examples [23], [27], [31], [32] and we will show
in the following sections how they make our Adversarial
Embedding approach among the best watermarking and
steganography techniques.
Another active field of research about adversarial examples
is the detection of these perturbations. It can be used as a
preemptive defence by flagging suspicious inputs to be handled
by a specific pipeline (human intervention, complex analy-
sis....). In 2017, Carlini et al. surveyed 10 popular detection
techniques [33] and demonstrated that they can all be defeated
by adjusting the attack algorithm with a custom loss function.
Their work showed that the properties that researchers believed
were inherent to the adversarial attack process, and were used
to detect them are not a fatality and can be bypassed by simple
optimizations in the attack algorithm.
Since his work, new detection mechanisms have been
proposed, borrowing techniques from statistical testing [34],
information theory [35] and even steganography detection
[36]. However, no technique has demonstrated its ability to
apply to every model, dataset and attack available in the
literature without being easy to bypass by the optimization
of existing attack algorithms.
III. ADVERSARIAL EMBEDDING
Our objective is to provide an integrated pipeline for image
watermarking and steganography that relies on the known
properties of adversarial examples. We name our approach
adversarial embedding. Its principle is to encode a message as
a sequence of adversarial images. Each of those images results
from altering given original images (cover images) to force
a given N -class ML model to classify them into a targeted
class. To decode the message, the recipient has to use the
same model to classify the adversarial images to retrieve their
class numbers, which together form the decoded message.
A. Inputs and Parameters
More precisely, our pipeline comprises the following com-
ponents:
• An image classification dataset {Ii}: The dataset de-
fines the number N of classes (of the related classification
problem) which, in turn, determines the size of the
alphabet used for the encoding. We can provide our
system with any number of images. Still, adversarial
attack algorithms may fail to work on some images. The
more images in the dataset, the more we increase the size
and diversity of the space of the adversarial images that
can be used for the encoding.
• A pair of encoder/decoder Eλ/E′λ: Having defined N
through the choice of the dataset, we have to transform
a (e.g.) binary secret message in Base N . Conversely,
at the decoding stage, we transform back the retrieved
Base-N message into the original binary message. We use
such encoder/decoder pair in a black-box way and make
no assumption regarding their properties. For instance,
the encoding can be improved to support redundancy
or sanity check techniques but this is not a stringent
requirement for our approach to work.
• A classification model Mθ: Although our method is
compatible with any N -class classification model that can
deal with the chosen dataset, we focus more particularly
on Deep Neural Networks (DNNs) as those are arguably
the established solution for image classification. θ denotes
the set of parameters that define the model. In DNN clas-
sifiers, the parameters include the architecture (number,
types and inner parameters of the layers), the weights
of the layers learned during training, hyperparameters,
etc. The model acts as a secret key for both encoding
and decoding. Our approach assumes that the model can
Fig. 1: Sending and decoding a stego-image: When Alice
sends the crafted images to Bob, they can suffer perturbation
while in transit. These perturbations can be random or mali-
cious. Besides, a third party would try to detect if the image
contains any hidden message, and extract the message if any.
Bob, on the other hand, possesses the right decoder to recover
the original message.
be transmitted from the sender to the intended recipient
of the message without being intercepted or altered (e.g.
through a secure physical device). The choice of the
model also impacts the success rate of the adversarial
attack algorithms and, thus, the images that can be used
for the encoding.
• An adversarial attack algorithm A: We can use any
targeted adversarial attack algorithm that can force a
model to classify a given image in a chosen class.
The hyperparameters of the attack, noted , include the
maximum amount of perturbation allowed on images as
well as attack-specific parameters. The choice of the
attack algorithm and its parameters impacts the success
rate of the attack and the detectability of the perturba-
tion. In this work, we focus more particularly on the
Projected Gradient Descent (PGD) [26] attack because
we found it provides a good balance between success rate
and perturbation minimization. Moreover, PGD randomly
selects starting points around the original images, which
makes the embedding non-deterministic (i.e. the same
message and the same original image can lead to different
steganography images) and, thus, harder to detect (see
Section VI-B). Finally, PGD is known to have a low
transferability from one model to another [31], which
increases the resilience of our approach to illegitimate
decoding (see Section VI-C).
B. Embedding Pipeline
Figure 2 illustrates an instantiation of our approach to
embed binary messages Dsec = b1 . . . bL ∈ {0, 1}L of length
L into an image dataset with N = 10 classes. First, we use
Eλ to encode Dsec into base 10, resulting in a new message
Denc = n1 . . . nL′ ∈ {1..10}L′ of length L′ = dL× log 2logN e. L′
is also the number of adversarial images needed to encode the
message. In the second step, we apply the adversarial attack
(a) Step 1 of the encoding process: To embed a 52 bits secret message in a
32x32 color picture. We first select a model that supports image classification
of 32x32x3 pictures. We can use a model trained to classify cifar-10 dataset
into 10 classes for instance. We encode therefore our message into base 10.
(b) Step 2 of the encoding process: We convert every element of the encoded
message into a logit (a 10 element vector with one 1 and 0 everywhere else).
This logit is then used to craft targeted attacks using a cover image (it can be
the same or a different cover image per stego-image). Each logit leads to a
different stego-image.
Fig. 2: Embedding a message using targeted adversarial attack.
A to insert targeted adversarial perturbations into L′ original
images I1 . . . IL′ (picked with or without replacement), result-
ing into L′ adversarial images A(I1) . . . A(IL′) such that
Mθ classifies A(Ij) into class nj . These adversarial images
form the sequence of steganography images that are sent to the
recipient throughout a (potentially unsecure) channel. While
a malicious third party can intercept the sent images, we
assume that either the channel is reliable enough to preserve
the image ordering or that some consistency mechanism allows
to retrieve this ordering reliably.
C. Decoding Pipeline
Once the recipient receives the adversarial images, he can
input them sequentially into the classification Mθ (which
was previously transmitted to her securely) to retrieve their
associated class. The resulting class numbers form back the
Denc message (in Base 10), which can then go through the
decoder Eλ′ to retrieve the original binary message Dsec.
External disruptions may alter the images, due to the natural
process of the carrier (e.g. websites and mobile applications
often show only compressed versions of the images) or
malicious intent from a third party. For instance, copyright
enforcement is a popular application of watermarking. To
circumvent this protection while permitting the illegal use
of the protected material, malicious people can degrade the
mediums with local transformations (e.g. rotation, cropping
...). In such cases, the recipient needs Mθ to correctly classify
altered images resulting from applying the aforementioned
transformations to the adversarial images. It is desirable for
adversarial embedding to be resilient to such transformation,
such that the classification of Mθ remains preserved in spite
of the transformations.
IV. SORTED ADVERSARIAL TARGETED ATTACK (SATA)
A drawback of adversarial embedding as described previ-
ously is that it can only encode log2N bits per adversarial
image (where N is the number of classes). In the particular
case of Cifar-10 and its 32x32 images and 3 channels, this
yields a density of 9.77e-4 bits per pixel (BPP). By contrast,
alternative solutions achieve a BPP between 0.1 and 0.2 [3].
Comparing embedding density is not always fair, though, as
the density of adversarial embedding depends on the number
of classes and not the number of pixels.1 Thus, its BPP density
depends exclusively on the used dataset.
Nevertheless, this limited density originates from the fact
that existing adversarial attack algorithms maximize the classi-
fication probability of one class, without considering the other
classes. This restricts the embedding to use only one value per
image, the most probable class value.
To improve density without changing dataset, we propose a
new targeted attack that forces the top-k classes suggested by
the model for a given image. Thus, the encoding of a message
chunk is not only the top class suggested by the model but the
top-k ones. We name this type of adversarial attack algorithm
Sorted Adversarial Targeted Attack (SATA) and we instantiate
its principle to extend the PGD algorithm.
Existing targeted adversarial attack algorithms that rely on
gradient back-propagation measure the gradient to the target
class. This gradient is iteratively used to drive the perturbation
added to the input image until the image is misclassified as
expected. In SATA, we consider all classes and measure the
gradient toward each class. Then, we add a perturbation to
the input with a weighted combination of these gradients.
The weight is 1 for the top-1 class we want to force, and it
decreases gradually for each next class. The more k classes we
force, the harder it is to ensure that the classes are sufficiently
distinguishable and the harder it is to build an appropriate
perturbation.
Apart from that, the remaining parts of our SATA algorithm
are similar to PGD: we apply small perturbation steps itera-
tively until we reach a maximum perturbation value (based on
L2 distance) and we repeat the whole process multiple times
to randomly explore the space around the original input.
A. Algorithm
Algorithm 1 describes our SATA algorithm. It calls several
internal procedures. SplitIntoChunks (Line 1) takes as
1Established benchmark datasets like MNIST, Cifar-10 and ImageNet
exhibit some correlation between their number of classes and image resolution.
However, others like NIH Chest X-Ray have large images categorized in few
classes.
input the full message and splits it into chunks, each of
which contains up to k different Base-N digits. Each of these
numbers represents a class that we want to force into the top
k (the i-th digit corresponding to the i-th top class). The digits
must be different because a class cannot occur in two ranks
at the same time. This implies that a chunk cannot contain
two identical digits. To avoid this, we cut chunks as soon as a
digit occurs in it for the second time or when reaching k digits.
Then, the number of chunks (into which the full message was
decomposed) corresponds to the number of images required
to encode the message. For instance, splitting 29234652 into
chunks of maximum size k = 3 using a dataset of N = 100
classes leads to two chunks [{29, 23, 46}, {52}]. This means
that encoding this message requires two adversarial images.
The model should classify the first image into 29 as the most
probable class, 23 as the second most and 46 as the third
most. If we set k = 4 instead, we can encode the message
using one adversarial image, such that the model predicts 52
as the fourth most probable class.
Next, the buildWeightedLogits procedure (Line 2)
computes, for each chunk, the weights applied to the gradient
of each class when building the perturbation. We start with
w1 = 1 and decrease the subsequent weights following an
exponential law: wi = (1 − (i−1)k )γ ∀i ∈ {1, ..., k}. γ is a
hyperparameter of SATA that has to be set empirically.
Having our chunks and weights, we enter a loop where
we perform R trials to generate a successful perturbation
(Lines 5–16). At each trial, randomPick procedure (Line
6) randomly picks, from the whole set of original images, as
many images as the number of chunks that must be encoded.
The procedure computeAdv (Line 9) computes the
weighted gradients with all the target classes and use them
to drive the adversarial images with a small perturbation
step without exceeding the maximum amount of perturbation
allowed.
This procedure is elaborated in Algorithm 2. It uses similar
sub-procedures as PGD:
• RandomSphere(x, epsilon): builds a matrix of
the same shape as ’x’ and a radius epsilon centered
around 0.
• Project(v,eps): projects the values in ’v’ on the L2
norm ball of size ’eps’.
• LossGradient(x,y): measures the loss of the clas-
sification model on every input x to its associated classes
y.
Finally, the computeSuccess procedure (Line 10)
checks if the most probable classes are correctly predicted.
Any chunk that has one or more classes disordered is con-
sidered as a failure (returns 0). If a message requires multiple
chunks to be embedded (i.e. multiple cover images), compute-
Success returns the average success rate over all chunks.
B. Embedding Capacity and Density
For a dataset with N class, the worst-case embedding
capacity (in bits) of the standard adversarial embedding (using
Algorithm 1: SATA algorithm
input : A classifier Mθ; A dataset of cover images I
and encoded message {Denc,i}L′i=1; step size
step; maximum perturbation size ; total
iterations L; Number of random starts R;
Number of classes of the model N . Number
of classes to encode per image k where
k ≤N
output: bestAdv: The stegano-images that encode
Denc
1 Dchunk ← SplitIntoChunks(Denc,N ,C)
2 weightedLogits ←
buildWeightedLogits(Dchunk);
3 bestRate ← 0 ;
4 bestAdv ← Null ;
5 for j ← 1 to R do
6 Istart ←randomPick(I ,‖Dchunk ‖);
7 advX ← Istart ;
8 for i← 1 to L do
9 advX ← computeAdv(advX ,
weightedLogits, Istart, Dchunk, step, ) ;
10 sucessRate ← computeSuccess(Mθ,
advX , weightedLogits, m);
11 if sucessRate > bestRate then
12 bestRate ← sucessRate;
13 bestAdv ← advX;
14 end
15 end
16 end
Algorithm 2: computeAdv procedure
input : A set of adversarial images advX; A matrix
of weights weightedLogits; A set of
cover-images Istart; y A set of targeted
classes per image; A maximum perturbation
size ; a step perturbation size step
output: advX: A more perturbed set of adversarial
images
1 advX ← advX+ RandomSphere(advX ,)
2 grad ← −1× LossGradient(advX ,y)
3 grad ← grad‖grad‖
4 advX ← advX + step × grad · weightedLogits
5 perturbation ← Project(advX- Istart,)
6 advX ← Istart + perturbation
PGD to encode one digit per image) is logNlog 2 . Thus, with Cifar-
10, each image can encode 3 bits. With SATA, each image
encodes k classes.
Let us assume k = 2. In this case, each image can encode
one of the 90 couples of different 0–9 digits. The couples with
the same two digits cannot be encoded since a class cannot
be the first and second most probable class at the same time.
Thus, in 90% of the cases, the capacity of an image becomes
6 bits. However, when two successive numbers to encode are
identical, we have to use two images (each of which has,
therefore, a capacity of 3 bits). On average, the embedding
capacity of SATA with k = 2 and a 10-class dataset is, thus,
6 × 90% + 3 × 10% = 5.7 bits. Given that Cifar-10 images
contain 32x32 pixels and 3 channels, this yields an embedding
density of 1.86e− 3 BPP.
We extend this study empirically to classifiers with 100
classes, 1,000 classses and 10,000 classes in Section VI-E1.
Further raising k can increase significantly the capacity
(although the marginal increase lowers as k goes higher).
However, as the adversarial attack has to force the model to
rank more classes, its success rate decreases. We investigate
this trade-off in our empirical evaluation.
V. EVALUATION SETUP
A. Objectives
Our evaluation aims at determining whether adversarial
embedding is a viable technique for steganography and water-
marking. For such techniques to work, a first critical require-
ment is that a third-party should not detect the embedding
in the images. Thus, we focus on the ability of adversarial
embedding to avoid detection, either by manual or automated
inspection. For the first case (manual inspection) we want to
ensure that humans cannot identify the adversarial embedding.
To validate we check whether the images with the embedding
can be distinguished from the original ones. If not, then
we can be sure that our embedding can pass unnoticed. In
steganography, this is important for the confidentiality of the
message; in watermarking, this ensures that the watermark
does not alter the perception of the image by the end-user.
Thus, we ask:
RQ1. Does adversarial embedding produce elusive (wrt
human perception) images?
As for automated methods, steganalysis is the field of re-
search that studies the detection of hidden messages and water-
marks implemented using steganography techniques. Having
intercepted a load of exchanged data, steganalysis methods
analyze the data and conclude whether or not they embed
hidden messages. We confront adversarial embedding to those
methods and ask:
RQ2 Can adversarial embedding remain undetected by
state-of-the-art steganalysis methods?
A second security requirement is that, in the case where a
third-party detected an embedded message in the cover, it is
unable to extract it. In our method, the classification model
from which the adversarial embedding is crafted is the key
required to decode the message. If we assume that the third-
party has no access to this model, the only way to decode
is by building a surrogate model and classify the adversarial
examples exactly as the key model does. Thus, we ask:
RQ3. Can adversarial embedding be extracted by different
models?
After studying the confidentiality of the embedded infor-
mation, we turn our attention towards its integrity when
reaching the recipient (in steganography) or when checking
the authenticity of the source (in watermarking). Integrity is
threatened by image tampering. Under the assumption that the
model used to craft the adversarial embedding is unaltered,
we want to ensure that decoding tampered images still yields
the original message. We consider spatial domain tampering
resulting from basic image transformations (rotation, upscaling
and cropping) as well as frequency domain tampering like
JPEG compression and color depth reduction. We ask:
RQ4 Is adversarial embedding resilient to spatial domain
and frequency domain tampering?
The last part of our study focuses on the steganography
use case and considers the benefits of our SATA algorithm
to increase the density (in bits per pixel) achieved by the
adversarial embedding (by targeting k classes). We study this
because it is possible to get a smaller success rate by SATA
(that considers multiple classes) compared to PGD (which
targets a single class). We study this trade-off and ask:
RQ5 What are the embedding density and the success
rate achieved by of Sorted Adversarial Targeted
Attack?
Density and success rate are dependent on the number N of
classes that are targeted by the attack algorithm. Thus, we
study this question for different values of N . In particular, we
are interested in the maximum value of N , which suggest the
maximum capacity of SATA to successfully embed informa-
tion.
B. Experiment subjects
Messages. Most of our experiments consider two messages
to encode. Message1 is a hello message, encoded in Base
10 as 29234652. Message2 is a randomly-generate message
of 100 alpha-numerical characters encoded in Base 10.
In our RQ5 experiments we asses the embedding density of
3 classifiers with 1000 thousand randomly generated messages
each (of length of 6.64 Kbits for the first 2 classifiers and 33
Kbits for the third classifier) then use Message3, a randomly-
generated message of 6.64 kbits to assess the tradeoff between
density and success rate.
Image dataset. We use the Cifar-10 dataset [37] as original
images to craft the adversarial embedding. Cifar-10 comprises
60,000 labelled images scattered in 10 classes, with a size of
32x32 pixels and 3 color channels (which make it suitable for
watermarking). With 10 classesand one-class embedding (PGD
for instance), every image can embed 3 bits (23 ≤ 10 < 24).
With the 32x32 pixel size and the 3 color channels, this
yields an embedding density of 9.77e−4 BPP. By comparison,
ImageNet usually uses images of 256x256 pixels and supports
21K categories which allow us to embed up to 14bits per
image. However, due to the size of images, the image density
is only 7.12e-5 BPP. Moreover, classification models for Cifar-
10 require reasonable computation resources (compared to
ImageNet) to be trained.
Classification models. Our experiments involve two pre-
trained models taken from the literature and 100 generated
models. The two pre-trained models are (i) the default Keras
architecture for Cifar-102 – named KerasNet – and a Resnet
20 (V1) architecture. Both achieve +80% accuracy with Adam
Optimizer, data-augmentation and 50 training epochs. The
remaining 100 models were produced by FeatureNet [38], a
neural architecture search tool that can generate a predefined
number of models while maximizing diversity.
C. Implementation and Infrastructure
All our experiments run on Python 3.6. We use the popular
Keras Framework on top of Tensorflow and various third-party
libraries. The Github repository of the project3 defines the
requirements and versions of each library.
To craft the adversarial examples, we use the PGD algorithm
with its default perturbation step and maximum perturbation
parameters [26]. To make sure these algorithm and parame-
ters are relevant, we measure the empirical success rate of
the algorithm in applying adversarial embedding on Cifar-
10 with the Keras model. We encode Message 2 into 154
adversarial images produced by applying PGD on 154 original
images selected randomly (without replacement). We repeat
the process 100 times (resulting in 15,400 runs of PGD)
and measure the percentage of times that PGD successfully
crafted an adversarial example. We obtain a 99% success rate,
which tends to confirm the relevance of PGD for adversarial
embedding.
Model generation and training (using FeatureNet) were
performed on a Tesla V100-SXM2-16GB GPU on an HPC
node. All remaining experiments were performed on a Quadro
P3200-6GB GPU on a I7-8750, 16Gb RAM laptop.
VI. EVALUATION RESULTS
A. RQ1: Visual Perception of Perturbations
We rely on two metrics to quantify the perception of the
perturbation on adversarial images. The first is Structural
Similarlity Index Metric (SSIM) [39], which roughly measures
how close two images are. It is known to be a better metric
than others like signal-to-noise ratio (PSNR) and mean squared
error (MSE). In [40], the authors show that humans cannot
perceive perturbations with a SSIM loss smaller than 4%.
Depending on the case, humans might start perceiving small
perturbations from 4% to 8% of SSIM loss.
The second metric is LPIPS [41]. It relies on a surrogate
model (in our case, we used an AlexNet [42]) to assess
perceptual similarity. A preliminary study [41] showed that
2https://keras.io/examples/cifar10 cnn/
3https://github.com/yamizi/Adversarial-Embedding
TABLE I: Perceptual similarity loss between original images
and the images produced by adversarial embeddings. The
first two lines relate to the 8 original images used to embed
Message1. The last two lines relate to the 154 images used
to embed Message2.
Image set Perturbation SSIM loss (%) LPIPS loss (%)
Message1 Adv. Emb. 8.98 +/- 0.75 0.29 +/- 3.71e-04
Message1 JPEG (75%) 8.17 +/- 0.21 1.07 +/-3.44e-03
Message2 Adv. Emb. 6.02 +/- 0.58 0.33 +/- 9.68e-04
Message2 JPEG (75%) 6.65 +/- 0.20 1.05 +/- 8.44e-03
it outperforms SSIM in terms of correlation with human
perception and it can compare more finely perturbations with
close SSIM values.
To evaluate whether humans can perceive the perturbations
incurred by adversarial embedding, we embed Message1
using 8 cover images and Message2 using 154 cover images.
In both cases, we applied PGD on the KerasNet model
to generate the adversarial images. Then, we measure the
SSIM and LPIPS losses between the original images and the
perturbed images. To complement our analysis, we compare
the degree of perceived perturbation (as computed by the
metrics) with the one resulting from applying a 75% quality
JPEG compression (resulting in a loss of information of 25%)
on the original images.
Table I shows the results. The embedding of Message1
results in images with a mean SSIM loss of 8.98%, while
the mean LPIPS loss is 0.29%. As for Message2, the mean
SSIM loss is 6.02% and the mean LPIPS loss is 0.33%. The
SSIM loss indicates that some human eyes could observe
minor effects on the images, but this effect remains small.
Moreover, the LPIPS metric reveals that the perturbation due
to adversarial embedding is 3 times less noticeable than the
ones incurred by JPEG compression. Overall, our results tend
to show that the produced adversarial images remain within
an acceptable threshold of human perception.
It is to be noted that the degree of perturbation depends on
the choice of the adversarial attack algorithm and its parameter.
We selected PGD as a relevant baseline. Still, we can further
reduce this impact by lowering the maximum perturbation of
PGD or by using alternative algorithms that are known to apply
smaller perturbations, e.g. CW [27]. In the end, this choice
boils down to a compromise between perturbation, efficiency
and the rate of success (in creating the adversarial images).
Similarly, using a different classifier leads to different
perceptual loss values. In Fig 3, some models cause lower
LPIPS loss when embedding the image while others achieve
better performance in terms of SSIM loss. Some models even
achieve SSIM loss lower than the threshold a human eye can
notice.
B. RQ2: Detection by Steganalysis
A basic approach in image steganalysis would be to
compare the intercepted data with some original reference.
This, however, does only work if the difference between
the two is only caused by the embedding and not any al-
(a) Mean SSIM loss values between the original cover image and the stego
image. The lower the better.
(b) Mean LPIPS loss values between the original cover image and the stego
image. The lower the better.
Fig. 3: SSIM & LPIPS loss values of the images encoded
using one of the 100 sampled models. The red lines indicate
the values we obtained by the KerasNet model we studied in
details in Table I.
teration/noise/tampering during transit. Steganalysis focuses
therefore on identifying the noise profile of different steganog-
raphy techniques. A basic technique is the LSB embedding: It
uses the Least Significant Bits to embed the message to hide.
Other techniques rely either on a statistical analysis of the
noise to identify patterns (SPA) or even Deep Neural Network
to learn the patterns. The latter technique is the most efficient,
it requires, however, the steganalyst to have a large number of
labelled images to train the model to recognize the embedding
technique.
We test 2 different detectors on a set of 154 stego-images
(generated by encoding Message2) and 154 clean images and
measured the AUC score of the detectors:
• LSB matching detector: We measure an AUC-ROC score
of 0.5, which was expected as this detectors was tailored
for steganography techniques that are based on LSB
embedding.
• SPA dectector: We also measure an AUC-ROC score
of 0.5. This however demonstrates that our embedded
images do not show common statistical features that can
be used to identify them.
To sum up, common detectors do not perform better than
random chance into distinguishing relevant pictures (stego-
Fig. 4: Decoding rate achieved by 100 diverse models gener-
ated by FeatureNet.
images with Adversarial Embedding) from clean pictures.
C. RQ3: Decoding by Alternative Models
We study whether a different model can classify the adver-
sarial examples (forming the embedding) exactly as the model
used to craft them does. We consider Message2 and the 154
adversarial images used to encode it, which were produced
by applying PGD on the KerasNet. Then we make different
models classify the adversarial images: the KerasNet with
different parameters, the ResNet model, and the 100 models
generated by FeatureNet. All models were trained using the
whole Cifar-10 training set. The capability of those models to
decode the message is measured as the percentage of images
that they classify like the original KerasNet, which we name
decoding rate.
KerasNet with different parameters achieves a decoding
rate of 23.72%, while the ResNet achieves 12.18%. This
indicates that adversarial embedding is highly sensitive to both
the model parameters and architecture. To confirm this, we
show in Figure 4 the decoding rate achieved by the generated
models. It results that no model can retrieve the class (as
labelled by the original KerasNet) of more than 37% of the
adversarial images, with more than half failing to surpass 26%
of decoding rate.
All these low decoding rates increase our confidence that
neither randomly-picked models nor handcrafted, state-of-
the-art models can break the confidentiality of adversarial-
embedded messages. Even if the malicious third party knows
the model architecture used for the embedding, differences
in parameters also result in a low capability to decode the
message illicitly.
D. RQ4: Resilience to image tampering
1) Spatial Domain Tampering: We focus first on soft image
tampering and three local image alterations:
• Rotation: We rotate the images by 15.
• Upscaling: We use bilinear interpolation to resize the
images to 64x64 pixels.
• Cropping: We remove 12.5% of the images by cropping,
keeping only the central part.
(a) Rotation
(b) Upscaling
(c) Cropping
Fig. 5: Recovery rate of the 100 generated models against
three spatial-transformations of the stego-images. The red
lines indicate the values we obtained by KerasNet model.
Regardless of the transformation, there is always a model that
can be used to achieve a high embedding recovery. We achieve
up to 94.9% recovery rate after rotation perturbation, 94.2%
after cropping and 99.4% recovery rate after upscaling. This
confirms the high flexibility of our approach and demonstrates
its high resilience against spatial-based transformation.
These transformations are common when copyrighted images
are shared illegally [43].
To measure the resilience of adversarial embedding to those
transformations, we consider the 100 generated models and the
images. We create three altered versions of each image, using
the three transformations above independently. Then, for each
model m, original image o and altered image a, we check
whether m assigns the same class to o and a. If that is not
the case, it means that the alteration results in changing the
classification of the image, thereby threatening the integrity
of messages encoded by adversarial embedding. We measure
the resilience of m to each transformation t by computing the
recovery rate of m against t, i.e. the percentage of images
resulting by applying t that m classifies in the same class as
their original counterpart.
Figure 5 shows, for each transformation, the recovery rates
achieved by the 100 models. We observe that, for all trans-
formations, we can always find a classification model that
achieves a high recovery rate. 99% for upscaling transfor-
mation, 94.9% for rotation transformation and 94.2% under
cropping perturbation, these results indicate that adversarial
embedding is resilient to spatial-tampering of the images
and that we can craft adversarial models strong against such
transformations.
It is worth noticing that our default model, KerasNet, crafted
and trained to achieve high classification accuracy is not the
best model to ensure the most robust embedding.
2) Frequency Domain perturbations: Next, we study the
impact of two aggressive image tampering: JPEG compression
(A frequency domain transformation) and Color Depth Reduc-
tion (CDR). JPEG compression relies on various steps (color
transformation, DCT, quantization) that cause information
loss. CDR reduces the number of bits used to encode different
colors. For instance, Cifar-10 images use a 32 bits color depth.
This means that every channel is encoded on 32bits. Reducing
color depth to 8 bits makes the picture contain less tone
variation and fewer details. We apply JPEG compression with
a 90%, a 75% and 50% quality rates (resulting in loss of
information of 10%, 25% and 50%, respectively) and CDR
(to 8 bits, leading to pictures with only 1/12 of the original
information) independently and we measure again the recovery
rate achieved by the 100 models.
In Fig 6(a), our models achieve up to 100% recovery rate
under jpeg compression (Q=90). When the compression rate
increases, we can still achieve up to 95% (Fig 6(b)) recovery
rate against jpeg(Q=75) and one of our models achieves more
than 72% recovery rate under a jpeg(Q=50) compression(6(c)).
Our models also show a spread robustness to color depth
reduction (Fig 6(d)) and reach up to 88% recovery rate.
E. RQ5: SATA Embedding
1) Embedding Capacity: To determine how much data our
adversarial embedding with SATA could achieve, we randomly
pick 1,000 messages of 6,643 bits and use our technique to
determine how many pictures are needed depending on how
much classes we would embed per picture. Once we know
(a) Low JPEG compression (90%)
(b) Average JPEG compression (75%)
(c) High JPEG compression (50%)
(d) Color Depth Reduction
Fig. 6: Recovery rate of the 100 generated models against
aggressive image transformations. The red lines indicate the
values we obtained by the KerasNet model we studied in
details.
(a) Embedding Density for classifiers with 10 classes
(b) Embedding Density for classifiers with 100 classes
Fig. 7: Average number of images used to embed 1,000
random messages of 6,643 bits each (blue line) and its
associated embedding density (red line) as we increase the
number of classes embedded per picturs using 10 and 100
classes classification models.
the number of pictures needed, we measure the embedding
density in the case of color pictures of 32x32 pixels.
Fig 7(a) confirms our previous estimate that a 10-class
classifiers has a density from 1.87e−3 BPP with 2 classes
embedded per image to 9.7e−3 BPP when embedding 9
classes per image.
With a 100-classes image classification model (Fig 7(b)), we
can achieve up to 0.2 BPP (standard density of steganography
techniques [3]).
If we use larger models that support 10.000 classes (Ima-
geNet classifiers for instance), we exceed a density of 10 Bits
per Pixel (Fig 8), improving over any existing steganography
technique [1].
2) Embedding Capacity and Success Rate Trade-off:
To embed many classes per image, we have to tweak the
hyperparameters of our embedding, to ensure that we recover
all the classes encoded in the right order (i.e. the success rate
of our embedding).
To maximize the success rate, we used a grid search
to find the best combination of the following two SATA
hyperparameters:
Fig. 8: We embed 1,000 messages of 33 Kbits eachs using a
10,000 classes model. The plot tracks the average number of
images used (blue line) and its associated embedding density
(red line) as we increase the number of classes embedded per
picture.
Fig. 9: Best SATA Multi-class embedding hyper-parameter γ
values and their associate mean embedding sucess rate over
1000 cover images.
• γ, which controls the relative weights of the k forced
classes.
•  the maximum amount of perturbation (measured as L2
distance) SATA can apply to an image.
The best  was always 0.5, while the ideal value of γ changed
depending on k.
SATA attack has also other hyperparameters that we kept
unchanged from the PGD implementation. For instance the
perturbation step step = 0.1 and the number of random
initialisations within the epsilon ball numrandom init = 10.
We ran our experiment using the KerasNet model and
picked our cover images randomly from the cifar-10 dataset.
We associate each image with a binary result set to success
SATA managed to find a successful perturbation leading to
the intended encoding; otherwise, it is set to failed. Then, the
success rate of SATA is measured as the percentage of images
for which it was successful.
Table 9 presents, for values of k, the success rate when
SATA embeds a randomly-generated message of 6,643 bits.
We see that SATA can always find at least an image to embed
up to seven classes per-image. Eight classes or more are not
achievable using our current model. For k = 7, the success
rate over 1000 images was 0.8%, meaning that SATA was
successful for 8 images.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we proposed an embedding pipeline that
hides secret messages in images by using image classification
(DNN) models and adversarial attack algorithms. We have
shown that such an approach can be used to form a highly
elusive (bypass detection techniques), flexible and customiz-
able steganography and watermarking technique. We have
also demonstrated that the combined use of a 1,000 output
class model with our new sorted adversarial attack algorithm
can achieve high-density embeddings (higher than existing
steganography research). We also showed that our embeddings
are resilient to image tampering, e.g., jpeg compression.
An inherent benefit of our approach is that it leverages
adversarial attack algorithms in a black-box way. Therefore,
our technique can take advantage of any, current or future,
state-of-the-art technique (targeted adversarial) coming out
from this highly active research area and (theoretically) can
be at least as effective as existing adversarial attacks (our
technique will remain effective as long as adversarial attacks
manage to remain undetected).
Future work should attempt to expand our study to larger
models and datasets, including other media where adversarial
examples have showed mature results (such as audio, video
and text).
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